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Encouraging Filing via Tax Credits 
and Social Safety Nets
James Alm, Georgia State University;  
Todd Cherry and Michael McKee, Appalachian State University;  
and Michael Jones, Bridgewater State College
A nontrivial fraction of the noncompliance associated with the per-sonal income tax is due to individuals who are not “in the system,” not having filed a tax return in the recent past or perhaps ever.  Erard 
and Ho (2001) have referred to those who have not filed as “ghosts,” and 
have investigated the extent to which this phenomenon contributes to the 
tax gap.  This phenomenon is most prevalent among middle-to low-income 
persons who are often “under the radar” of the tax authority because they 
receive income not subject to third-party withholding.  While the tax owed 
by such persons on their incomes is individually small, the aggregate amount 
contributes substantially to the tax gap, perhaps as much as $27 billion in Tax 
Year 2001.  A problem confronting policymakers is how to encourage these 
individuals to join the system by filing a tax return.  The payoff to the gov-
ernment from such inclusion may be very high, and evidence suggests that 
once individuals initially file a tax return they continue to do so in the future.
There are several potential avenues for encouraging tax filing.  One 
prominent class of policies encouraging tax participation is the receipt of 
direct benefits under various income transfer programs and public sector 
pensions, including social insurance programs like Social Security.  Receipt 
of benefits associated with these programs can be used to encourage tax fil-
ing since being “in the system” may be a condition for eligibility.  The use 
of tax credits like the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the child care 
tax credit to affect participation is a more targeted approach.  The behavioral 
issues in all cases include the role of risk attitudes, the prevalence of pres-
ent-biased preferences (i.e., myopic decisionmaking), and the impact of the 
compliance costs associated with taking advantage of these programs.  For 
example, the EITC is somewhat complicated, and this feature has probably 
led to lower participation.1
1  There also exist other policies that may increase compliance and participation.  Anxiety reduction for potential 
taxpayers as they approach the tax agency (i.e., emphasizing a “kinder, gentler, tax agency”) may increase compli-
ance and participation.  Research has shown that taxpayers respond to positive inducements to comply (Alm, 
Jackson, and McKee, 1992), but there may be consequences of such positive inducements on initially compliant 
taxpayers.  Tax amnesties can be an effective means of allowing taxpayers to “wipe the slate clean” if they have 
evaded taxes in the past (Alm, McKee, and Beck, 1990).  Similarly, perceptions of fairness have a significant effect 
on individual decisions (Cherry and List, forthcoming).  Also, some current tax policies often permit individuals to 
claim losses from some classes of earnings (e.g., capital gains, self-employment income) against income taxes  
Footnote continued on next page.
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The difficulty in assessing the effects of such policies is the obvious 
one: any such effects depend on the behavioral responses of individuals 
currently not filing tax returns and so not currently observable by the tax 
authority.  Indeed, studies of nonfiling using field data are not numerous.  
While compliance behavior is difficult to observe in the field, nonfiling is 
even more hidden.  Crain and Nourzad (1993) compared the characteris-
tics of those who evade while filing versus those who choose simply not to 
file.  In the most detailed and comprehensive study of nonfiling, Erard and 
Ho (2001) use IRS information to estimate the factors that affect nonfil-
ing.  Also, see Alm, Bahl, and Murray (1991) for an analysis of nonfiling in 
Jamaica.
As with all studies based on field data, these studies suffer from not 
having direct measures of noncompliance (e.g., the use of reported income, 
not unreported income), from being forced to contend with various econo-
metric issues (e.g., the endogeneity of audit selection arising from budgets 
for audit activities), and from not being able to control for all variables that 
might affect taxpayer reporting decisions (e.g., changes in the tax laws, tax-
payer attitudes, economic conditions).  Further, there are few changes in the 
rules for tax credits and/or income support programs, and such changes as do 
occur are often confounded with other effects such as changes in macroeco-
nomic conditions.
Some quasi-natural experiments have also been studied.  The introduc-
tion of the EITC has provided an opportunity to observe changes in the char-
acteristics of filers.  Most recently, one could study the effects of the Bush 
Administration “stimulus package” tax rebate checks on the filing behaviors 
of citizens, although those data are not yet available.  In the case of the 
EITC, Scholz (1994) uses 1990 Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP) data, and finds that the participation rate for the EITC is between 80 
percent and 86 percent.  See also Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches (2007).
Since it is the behavioral responses of individuals whom the tax au-
thority cannot directly observe that are of interest, the laboratory is a natural 
arena to investigate the effects of policies aimed at increasing tax partici-
pation.  Although there are numerous experimental studies that examine 
 
imposed on other wage and salary income, but only if the individual files a tax return.  While these policies are 
typically understood as focusing on higher-income taxpayers, the programs also affect middle-and low-income 
taxpayers and those working outside the purview of the tax authority (e.g., individuals with part-time self- 
employment or with cash only businesses).  Provided an individual has taxable income from wages and salaries, 
he or she can benefit from the use of offsets.  Indeed, the presence of loss offsets may encourage individuals to 
undertake entrepreneurial activities involving some risk of incurring losses.  “Social norms” may also affect tax 
compliance.  There has been work in this area, and the results suggest that such motives can have a positive effect 
on compliance.  Even so, there has been little literature on filing itself.  See, for example, Cummings, Martinez-
Vazquez, McKee, and Torgler (forthcoming).
Footnote continued from previous page.
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behavioral responses of those individuals who already file a tax return (e.g., 
Becker, Buchner, and Sleeking, 1987; Webley et al. 1991; Alm, Jackson, 
and McKee, 1992; Alm, Jackson, and McKee, 1993; Gerxhani and Schram, 
2006; Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, McKee, and Torgler, 2008), there are, 
so far as we can ascertain, no experimental analyses of filing inducements, in 
which subjects have the option to file or not to file a tax return.
Accordingly, our research here is directed at assessing the effects on 
filing of reinforcing the social insurance aspect of the fiscal system and of 
providing tax credits, either of which is received only if the taxpayer files a 
return.  To examine these issues, we introduce in a controlled laboratory set-
ting various filing inducements, including social safety nets and tax credits.  
Our results are preliminary, but suggest that such inducements can increase 
tax filing, with the most effective policy being tax credits that are simple to 
obtain.
The Filing Decision
The traditional theoretical development of the compliance decision typically 
begins with the assumption that the individual has already chosen to file a re-
turn.  Evasion is then modeled as a gamble in which the states of nature are 
being caught or not being caught, where, if caught, a fine is assessed (Alling-
ham and Sandmo, 1972).  The individual then decides only the amount of 
income to report and so the amount to evade.  A rational individual is viewed 
as maximizing the expected utility of the tax evasion gamble, weighing the 
benefits of successful cheating against the risky prospect of detection and 
punishment.  The individual pays taxes because he or she is afraid of getting 
caught and penalized if he or she does not report all income.  This approach 
gives the plausible and productive result that compliance depends on audit 
rates and fine rates.  Indeed, the central point of this approach is that an 
individual pays taxes because—and only because—of this fear of detection 
and punishment.  See Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998), Alm (1999), 
and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) for comprehensive surveys and discussions 
of this literature.
This compliance decision has been extensively investigated using field 
and lab data.  For those who file, the traditional recipe of increased audits 
and/or increased penalties is the recommended policy for increasing com-
pliance, subject of course to taxpayer awareness of the enforcement effort 
increase (Alm, Jackson, and McKee, 2007).
Of perhaps more interest is the issue of the filing decision.  To the 
extent that nonfilers are not “in the system” and so are not at risk of being 
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selected for audit, the traditional policy response of increased enforcement 
efforts is not effective.2  Indeed, the traditional Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) analysis does not fully capture this key element of the individual’s 
decisions.
For the filing decision, the individual must compare the expected utility 
from filing versus the expected utility from nonfiling, where an individual 
who files must also then determine the amount of income to report on the 
return (e.g., the compliance decision).  Erard and Ho (2001) expand the tradi-
tional model to include both the filing and the compliance decisions, by con-
structing a sequential decision process that includes such steps as the choice 
of income withholding, the decision to file, and the compliance decision.  
The framework is an extension of the typical “gamble” model of evasion, but 
incorporates the more realistic setting that reflects the true decision setting of 
the taxpayer.  In their framework, the decision to not file is influenced by the 
costs of filing, the probability of being identified as a nonfiler, and the penal-
ties for not filing.  To these, one should also incorporate the potential benefits 
from such tax credits as may exist and the existence of a social safety net 
where the benefits and/or coverage may be conditional on prior tax filings.  
Both the tax credit and the expected value of the social safety net represent 
positive inducements to file.  It is these positive inducements that our experi-
mental design investigates.
Experimental Design 
The experimental design captures the essential features of the voluntary 
income reporting and tax assessment system used in many countries.  Hu-
man participants in a controlled laboratory environment earn income through 
their performance in a task.  The participants must decide how much of this 
income to report to a tax agency.  Taxes are paid on reported income only.  
However, unreported income may be discovered via a random audit, and 
the participant must then pay the owed taxes plus a fine based on the unpaid 
taxes.3  This income earning, income reporting, audit, and penalty process 
is repeated over a number of rounds that each represent a tax period.  At the 
2  Most audit schemes are based on factors that are reported on tax returns and that past audit results indicate are 
associated with large amounts of unreported income (e.g., the Internal Revenue Service use of a “DIF” score).  
Individuals who do not file a return are obviously not at risk of audit from such audit schemes.
3  It may be argued that current audit practice in many countries also implements endogenous audits, since a tax-
payer either elicits an audit or not depending on his or her “score” in an audit rule.  However, whether a taxpayer is 
actually audited depends both on the score and on the audit budget of the tax authority.  Since the taxpayer cannot 
know this latter item with certainty, there remains a random component to the audit process.  See Alm and McKee 
(2004) for an experimental examination of this type of endogenous audit selection rule.
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completion of the experiment, all participants are paid in cash their labora-
tory market earnings converted to U.S. dollars.
These experiments are designed to inform policymakers, and so must 
satisfy the experimental precept of “parallelism” (Smith, 1982).  Parallelism 
is satisfied when the experimental setting captures the essential elements of 
the decision problem faced in the naturally occurring setting.  It is neither 
necessary nor desirable that the experimental setting implement all of the 
complexity of the naturally occurring setting (Plott, 1987).  As implemented, 
our experimental design follows the elements of much of the earlier experi-
mental research, but incorporates additional features to improve parallelism 
with taxpayers’ decisionmaking in the naturally occurring world.  Partici-
pants earn income by performing a task (rather than receiving an endow-
ment), they must choose how much income to report, and they face an audit 
process similar to that in the naturally occurring setting.  Importantly, par-
ticipants must choose whether or not to file a return.  The experiments utilize 
tax language in the instructions and the computer interface.  While the stakes 
are small, the decision is also simplified, implying that the ratio of decision 
costs to rewards parallels the naturally occurring setting.
Participants are recruited from the pool of undergraduate students at 
a major public university.  On arrival at the laboratory, participants are as-
signed to a computer station.  The lab server assigns participants to groups 
(consisting of seven to ten persons depending on the total number of partici-
pants in the session).  Basic instructions are provided via hardcopy, while 
the main instructions are provided via a series of screen images.  After the 
practice rounds are completed, any final procedural questions are answered.  
Participants are not allowed to communicate with one another during the 
session.  They are not told the exact duration of the experimental session, 
which is predetermined to last for 20 real rounds.  Sessions take on average 
70 minutes to complete.  Participant earnings range from $14 to $38, de-
pending on task earnings, reporting behavior, and audit experience.  Partici-
pants are told that payments will be made in private at the end of the session 
and that all responses are anonymous.
The earnings task requires participants to sort the digits 1 through 9 
into the correct ascending order from a randomized order presented in a 3 by 
3 matrix.  Participants do this by pointing the computer mouse and “click-
ing” on the numbers in the correct sequence.  On their computer screens, a 
3 by 3 matrix with the digits in random order appears on the right side of 
the screen; as the numbers are “clicked,” they appear in a 3 by 3 matrix on 
the left side of the screen.  A counter on the screen shows the elapsed time 
from when the first number is “clicked” and also when all nine numbers 
have been ordered.  Participants click the Continue button to transmit this 
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time to the server.  Actual income is then determined by the relative speed 
of performance, with the fastest performer receiving the highest income and 
the slowest performer receiving the lowest income.  Once all participants 
have completed the income task, they are informed via the computer of their 
incomes for the round and presented with a screen that provides details of 
the policy in effect, where they are informed of the tax rate, the audit prob-
ability, and the penalty rate on discovered evasion.  For the credit treatments, 
participants are informed of the level of the tax credit they are eligible to 
receive and that this is conditional on filing a tax return.  For the income 
support treatments, participants are informed of the probability of being un-
employed, the duration of unemployment, and the income support they are 
eligible to receive.  The unemployment benefits are determined as follows.  
The number of filing periods for eligibility is stated in the instructions, and 
the benefit is a stated percentage of the average of the incomes filed during 
the periods required for eligibility.
The tax form is not provided at this point.  Participants may choose 
to get a form or not, where there may be a cost for the form.  If participants 
choose not to obtain a tax form, then they do not file and are not subject to 
an audit in the current round.  If participants choose to get the form, then 
the cost, if there is one, is deducted from income for the round.  Even if 
participants obtain the form, they may still choose not to file by selecting the 
Not File button.  Since the tax filing season is limited, there is a time limit 
imposed (75 seconds), and a counter at the bottom of the tax form informs 
participants of the time remaining.  If the time expires and a tax form has 
not been filed, participants are automatically audited, and an additional 10 
percent penalty is imposed.
At the end of the session, participants complete a short questionnaire 
asking age, gender, and whether they prepare and file their own taxes.  If 
they respond “No” to this last question, we assume that their parents are re-
sponsible for tax preparation, given that participants are college sophomores, 
juniors, and seniors.
The process of determining who is audited is generated by a com-
puterized draw.  After the return is filed, participants are presented with an 
animated (computerized) representation of a bucket from which a draw is 
made.  In this bucket, there are 10 blue and white balls in total, with a white 
ball signifying no audit and a blue ball denoting an audit.  Each taxpayer 
is audited independently.  The balls “bounce” in this bucket, and, after a 
randomly determined interval, a door opens, and a ball exits the bucket 
through this door.  The color indicates whether the taxpayer will be audited.  
Participants choosing not to file a tax return are presented with a screen that 
informs them that they will not be audited in the current round.
Encouraging Filing via Tax Credits and Social Safety Nets 49
After the audit process has been completed, taxpayers are presented 
a new screen that provides earnings and audit outcome summaries for the 
round.  When group audit outcomes are provided, the end-of-round informa-
tion screen reports the number of audits conducted in the current round and 
the fines collected via audits in the current round.
As part of our investigation, we incorporate the effects of complexity 
on the propensity to claim the credit because a credit that is not claimed is 
unlikely to enhance filing.  We also incorporate the role for taxpayer infor-
mation services, following on the preliminary investigations reported in 
Alm, Jones, and McKee (2007).  Complexity is introduced in the experimen-
tal setting through the use of “fuzzy” information concerning allowed tax 
deductions and refundable tax credits.
Our overall objective is to examine the effects on tax filing of potential 
inducements to file a return, and we set out some basic inducement programs 
to investigate.  These are outlined in Table 1.  Our focus is on the use of tax 
credits and the income protection offered through unemployment benefits.  
To establish a baseline, we have conducted sessions in which these induce-
ments are absent but the other features of the tax filing regime are incorpo-
rated.  The no inducement treatments are described in Table 2.  The tax rate 
is set at 35 percent in all rounds of all sessions.  The audit probabilities range 
from 0.2 through 0.4 with three values in use in each session.  The rate is 
set for the first 8 rounds, changes for the second 8 rounds, and reverts to the 
original level for the final 4 rounds; for example, in Table 2, the audit rates 
for NI1 are 0.4 for 8 rounds, 0.3 for 8 rounds, and 0.4 for the final 4 rounds.  
Participants are instructed that the rate may change during the course of the 
session but are not told the specific pattern.  In all cases, the onscreen bingo 
cage shows the audit rate as the number of blue balls among 10 in the cage.
The tax form may cost from zero to two lab dollars, and this informa-
tion is presented at the time of choosing whether to obtain the form.  The 
tax form cost represents the general cost of filing incurred, in addition to the 
cognitive cost of completing the form.
Table 1.  General Treatment Design for Investigation of Inducements To File
Treatment Sample Parameters
No Positive Inducement Cost of Tax Form and Probability of Audit
Refundable Tax Credit Conditional on Low Income
Available to Low and 
Medium Income
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NI1 35% 0.4, 0.3, 0.4 150% 15%




The first set of filing inducements is the use of tax credits targeted 
at lower-income taxpayers.  This targeting is typically motivated by eq-
uity concerns, but it has the collateral effect of addressing a specific set of 
ghosts—those with lower incomes who may well be earning incomes that 
are not matched by employer records submitted to the tax authority.4  The 
basic tax credit settings are shown in Table 3 as CT1 and CT2, where “CT” 
denotes “Credit Treatment” and where the key difference is the targeting of 
the tax credit to the lower-income earners.  One issue arising from tax credit 
programs is the complexity of the filing requirement necessary to claim 
the credit.  The EITC provides a case in point, and Alm, Jones, and McKee 
(2007) examine complexity and the related information services provision 
by the tax authority.








CT1 10 – 100 1 per level 150% 0.3, 0.4, 0.3
CR = 20 – 0.2*I 
(Moderate Income 
Credit)
CT2 10 – 100 1 per level 150% 0.3, 0.4, 0.3
CR = 30 – 0.6*I 
(Low Income Credit)
Notes:  The “Income Range” 1 is 10 (“Low”) to 100 (“High”), with increments of 10 and 1 person per level.  The credit 
equation reports the intercept (e.g., the base credit) and the reduction in the credit as income increases.  For example, 
if CR = 20 – 0.2*I (“Moderate Income Credit”), then the base credit is 20 lab dollars; if the participant earns, say, 60 lab 
dollars, then the credit is 8 lab dollars; the credit goes to zero at 100 lab dollars.  In the “Low Income Credit” setting, 
the base credit is set at 30 lab dollars, and the credit drops to zero when the participant has earned 50 lab dollars.
The other inducement investigated here is the presence of an income 
program that pays (unemployment) benefits in the event of the individual 
becoming unemployed.  Payment of benefits is conditional on the previous 
filing history of the individual.  Specifically, benefit payouts are computed as 
a stated percentage of average income filed in previous periods.  The param-
eters in effect for this series of sessions are shown in Table 4, where “UT” 
denotes “Unemployment Treatment.”  Audit probabilities and cost of the 
4  Alm, Deskins, and McKee (2008) investigate experimentally the filing behaviors of individuals earning income 
not subject to the type of matching paperwork usually associated with formal sector earnings.  
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tax form are set at levels in the baseline and credit treatments so that we can 
focus on policy parameters specific to the unemployment benefits program 
and on effects of the risk of becoming unemployed.  Thus, in Table 4, we 
introduce as treatments the percentage of the income that will be replaced 
by unemployment benefits and the filing periods necessary to qualify for 
benefits.  
During periods of unemployment, participants do not see an income 
earning task screen.  Instead, they are presented a screen informing them 
that they are unemployed and that this is round X of unemployment period 
of duration Y.  The unemployment benefits are taxable.  Thus, participants 
are presented a screen informing them of the unemployment benefits (if any) 
that they will receive in the current round and the opportunity to obtain a tax 
form or not.  If participants file a tax return reporting unemployment benefit 
income, they are subject to the normal audit process.  If participants choose 
not to file, they are not audited.5
Table 4.  Income Support Settings









UT1 0.4 and 0.2 0.5 2 0.3, 0.4, 0.3 2, 1, 0
UT2 0.4 0.6 2 0.3, .04, 0.3 2, 1, 0
The instruments applied here are largely intended to target lower- 
income taxpayers.  The experimental setting has an income range that repre-
sents a low-to moderate-income range.  The tax credits apply to 50 percent 
to 90 percent of income earners, and the unemployment benefit safety net 
pays out 50 percent to 60 percent of average earnings.  Because of this 
targeting, the net tax yield from participants in all of these settings is quite 
small when the proposed programs are implemented.  For settings in which 
there are 10 participants in a group (the typical case), the income distribu-
tion ranges from a high of 100 lab dollars to a low of 10 lab dollars, and total 
income is 550 lab dollars; at a tax rate of 35 percent applied to net-of-deduc-
tion (15-percent) income, the tax yield for full compliance is 110 lab dollars 
per round.  By way of comparison, the per round cost of the Moderate Tax 
Credit is 90 lab dollars, and the per round cost of the Low Income Tax Credit 
is 60 lab dollars; for the social safety net (unemployment insurance), there is 
an expected cost (under full compliance and filing) of 90 lab dollars.  Thus, 
5  Of course, it is true that, in the naturally occurring world, individuals who do not (but should) file a tax return 
may be detected through, for example, the IRS Automated Underreporter program.  Even so, the probability that a 
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net yield to the tax authority of encouraging tax filing will generally be 
small.  Nevertheless, the objective is to increase filing, and it is this behavior 
that we analyze here.
Our hypothesis is that filing will increase under inducements offered 
by the tax credit and social safety net provisions.  The next section discusses 
our preliminary results.
Preliminary Results and Discussion
One hundred and six subjects participated in twelve sessions, each lasting 
between 18 and 20 rounds, thereby yielding 2,126 observations.  Treat-
ment variables include the cost of obtaining the tax form (“Form Cost”), the 
audit probability, the opportunity to claim a credit (“Credit”), the availabil-
ity of group audit information, the availability of unemployment benefits, 
and whether unemployment is possible.  Observed outcomes include the 
subject’s earned income (“Income Earned”), whether the subject bought the 
tax form (“Form Bought”), and whether the subject filed the form (“Form 
Filed”).  Subjects averaged 20 years of age, and just over half were female 
(51.9 percent).  The typical participant earned nearly 51 lab dollars per 
round, bought a tax form about 61 percent of the time, and filed the form 
nearly 59 percent of the time.  There was considerable variance across sub-
jects and rounds.
Given the complex nature of the experimental design, simple tests of 
hypotheses provide limited insight on treatment effects.  We therefore pro-
ceed directly to a conditional analysis at the individual level to estimate treat-
ment effects while holding other factors constant.  We predict that the propen-
sity to file will be increasing in the size of the direct inducements and in the 
perceived effect of the social safety net.  Since there are two decisions in each 
period (three if we include the compliance decision), we analyze the decision 
to obtain a form and the decision to submit or file the form separately.  
We estimate the following empirical model:
Ti,t = β1 + β2 Pi + β3 Ii + β4 p(A)i,t + β5Ci + β6Ui + β7 LBi,t-2 + β8(I*C)i + ψt + ui + εi,t ,
where the dependent variable Ti,t denotes subject i’s decision to buy or file a 
tax form in period t; Pi is the price subject i must pay to obtain a tax form; 
Ii is subject i’s earned income; p(A)i,t is the audit probability for subject i in 
period t; Ci and Ui  are indicator variables that signify the presence of a tax 
credit and unemployment benefits for subject i; LBi,t-2 is an indicator vari-
able that signifies that subject i received unemployment benefits two periods 
prior; (I*C)i is an interaction term between income and credit for subject i; 
ψt is a set of T-1 dummies that capture potential nonlinear period effects; ui is 
for random effects that control for unobservable individual characteristics; β1 
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is the constant term; and εi,t is the contemporaneous additive error term.  The 
dataset constitutes a panel with 106 subjects making a series of 20 decisions 
over time.  Since the dependent variables are binary, we estimate all relations 
using a panel probit estimation (Wooldridge, 2002).
From this basic specification, we estimate a “Form Bought” model (Ti,t 
= 1 if the form is bought, and 0 otherwise), and also a “Form Filed” model 
(Ti,t = 1 if the form is filed, and 0 otherwise).  For each model, one specifica-
tion controls for unobserved subject heterogeneity (denoted “1W”), while 
the other controls for both subject heterogeneity and time period effects 
(“2W”); Hausman tests suggest time effects are insignificant, but estimates 
are reported for completeness.  Table 5 presents the estimation results. 









































































Wald Chi-square 31.14*** 50.73*** 35.21*** 46.44***
Log likelihood -921.61 -911.10 -913.11 -907.03
Notes:  *denotes significance at 0.1 level, ** denotes significance at 0.05 level, and *** denotes significance at 0.01 level.
Estimates reported in Table 5 indicate that positive inducements en-
courage filing, where these inducements are measured by “Credit” (equal to 
1 if the tax credit is present, and 0 otherwise) and “Unemployment Benefit” 
(defined as the percentage of income replaced by unemployment benefit in 
the event of unemployment).  By providing a tax credit, individuals signifi-
cantly increased the buying and filing of tax forms (p<0.01), though this pos-
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itive effect diminishes with income, as indicated by the negative coefficient 
on the “Income Earned” X “Credit” interaction variable (see below).  The 
presence of unemployment benefits also significantly increases filing (“Form 
Filed”), though no significant effect appears in the “Form Bought” models.  
The influence of unemployment benefits is clearly evident when consider-
ing the change in behavior after receiving benefits.  Individuals significantly 
increase participation (buying and filing) after receiving unemployment 
benefits.  As expected, the likelihood of purchasing a tax form is negatively 
related to the cost of the form (“Form Cost”).  Recalling that the probability 
of an audit should not matter to subjects, our estimates in fact indicate that 
changes in the “Audit Probability” have no significant effect on participa-
tion.  Lastly, our estimates indicate that the level of “Income Earned” is 
positively related to participation.
Based on the tax credit formula (see Table 3), the tax credit is directed 
toward lower-income participants.  Thus, in the tax credit treatments, we 
predict that the credit will increase filing but only among the target popula-
tion; that is, compliance will be negatively correlated with income.  In-
deed, we find this result, as the coefficient on the interaction term “Income 
Earned” X “Credit” is negative and significant.
The complexity of the setting limits our ability to simply compare be-
havior across policy instruments.  Nevertheless, such results are interesting, 
and we provide a brief discussion of the filing behavior across treatments.  
The aggregate data are presented in Table 6.  All of the filing inducement 
programs increase the propensity to file relative to our baseline setting.  The 
social safety net increases the propensity to file but not by as much as the 
presence of the tax credit.  The targeted (Low Income) tax credit increases 
tax filing by approximately the same amount as does the more general (Mod-
erate Income) tax credit. 
Table 6.  Aggregate Filing Behavior
Treatment Frequency  of Filing
Frequency  
of obtaining Form
Cost of Specific 
Program
No Inducement 0.445 0.460 N/A
Credit (All) 0.624 0.660 N/A
Credit (Low Income) 0.610 0.665 60
Credit (Moderate 
Income) 0.630 0.655 90
Social Safety Net 0.561 0.579 90 (expected)
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Comparing the filing behavior impacts with the costs of running the 
various programs is an interesting policy exercise.  As we discussed above, 
the costs of these programs vary considerably.  The average (per round) 
costs are also reported in Table 6.  The broader (Moderate Income) tax credit 
program and the social safety net program are costly.  The narrower (Low 
Income) tax credit program yields the largest increase in both filing and form 
acquisition propensity.  As in many other instances, it appears that targeted 
programs yield superior results.
Conclusions
Encouraging filing has important policy implications.  Our experimental 
results are preliminary, but they indicate several promising strategies for 
encouraging greater tax filing rates.  In particular, targeted tax credits that 
are simple to obtain appear to have some potential for encouraging tax filing. 
Future work will further address such issues as the effects of the cost of fil-
ing on form acquisition, the potential interaction of inducement instruments, 
and the potential interaction of inducements and complexity/information.
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